The news media provides vital linkages between the public, the government and 2 military operations in the field. The instant and increasing flow of television news can set the national agenda. 3 There is increasing political sensitivity towards public opinion polls and media coverage of military operations. US security strategy, and by default the national military strategy, is responsive to national will and commitment to a particular cause.
It would be prudent for military leaders to recognize that public opinion is a center of gravity for all military operations because of its importance to the political well-being of any administration. Joint doctrine defines a center of gravity as: "That characteristic, capability, or locality from which a military force, nation or alliance derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight." 4 This paper explores the influence of the media on public opinion and with it the national will to fight. Decision-makers must prepare for the vulnerabilities real-time media creates during operations. The current trend toward nontraditional military missions coupled with multiple avenues to real-time news, increases public awareness of military operations.
The "spin" the media puts on the news influences public opinion almost immediately.
While the public has a right to know, does it need to know instantaneously? The author can find no public benefit to real-time news coverage of military operations other than its entertainment value. Instantaneous intelligence information only benefits military decisionmakers and the enemy. And, information is becoming a center of gravity for future operations.
As stated in Joint Vision 2010, "Real-time information drives parallel, not sequential, planning and real-time, not prearranged, decision-making," which suggests decisionmakers must adjust information processing procedures. Awareness of the role news media plays in formulating and executing US military policy is crucial for planners and decisionmakers. Now military commanders must try to influence public opinion as well as counter the enemy. Commanders should prepare for, understand and exploit real-time news coverage during military operations. This paper contributes to the notion that understanding the power of real-time news media on future operations is vital to military decision-makers.
Research Overview
The Gulf War ushered in many new aspects to military conflict. One of the biggest differences between the Gulf War and other conflicts was the early information dominance coalition forces enjoyed leading up to and during the war. In future conflicts, the commercial expansion of global satellite communications creates the potential for adversaries to collapse this advantage. If television is the most effective tool for shaping 5 the thoughts of masses of people, then it could be used as a weapon system in future information wars. Television could be the weapon of choice in deception and psychological warfare in the future. The full spectrum of information dominance is discussed in other articles. This analysis focuses on one component of the information dominance spectrum, real-time media reporting.
The union of two meaningful technological capacities affecting future conflict occurs during the Gulf War. The novel employment of precision guided munitions (PGM) and the technical capability to cover combat real-time via the media had previously not been possible in war. This was the first conflict extensively covered "live." The combination of these two factors highlights air power on television because of the video cameras on PGMs. However, the psychological impact of the media is evident in any military operation including ground, sea and air combat. If strategists identify national will or an alliance as a center of gravity (COG) then news media may affect its strength. The
Strategic Assessment for 1996, put it this way:
Should Washington react passively, its agenda will be set by what is on the television screen, but if Washington changes with the times, it can use its direct access to world publics to influence events more quickly and surely than ever. Similarly, if the revolution in military technology from the information explosion is integrated into a new way of conducting warfare-a revolution in military affairs-then the US can increase its domination of the battlefield. 6 Decision-makers are prone to look at future military operations through the lens of the most recent conflict. The uniqueness of the media coverage of the Somalia operation and the Gulf War establishes a strategic and operational perspective for real-time news impacts on military decision-makers.
The Impact Of Television News
Americans born anytime after the 1950's represent the first generation weaned on television. In most households, television is a major form of entertainment as well as a convenient way to keep up with daily news. With the advent of the Cable News Network (CNN) and its 24-hour news coverage the world receives the news with a rapidity and repetitiveness which quickly shapes public opinion. The Wall Street Journal noted, "TV has become more significant than any other single factor in shaping the way most of us view the world…more than religion or politics." 7 Communications technology is shrinking the globe with news reports delivering the images of battle into offices and living rooms while events are happening. Governments no longer have an opportunity to put their spin on events before they are viewed and analyzed by the world. Governments need to change with the times and get more aggressive in how they use this new capability. Public perception is introduced into military operations almost simultaneously with the operations itself. This puts diplomats and military officials in tenuous positions at times. 8 The media itself became an actor in the Gulf War. Major General Perry Smith, USAF (retired), a military analyst for CNN noted, "Over the six weeks of the war more people watched more hours of television per day than at any time in history." The media creates a surreal world to which governments, military forces, and nations must respond as though it were real. The actions of these "actors" are processed by the news media and turned 9 into the fictional electronic images that manipulate our behavior. For coverage of military operations, television has surpassed all other forms of news because it is visual and has instantaneous capability.
An odd new phenomenon occurs with real-time capability. The public now gets credible, current information with commentary from analysts during military operations.
In all but the most recent conflicts, this type of information was only available to government and military decision-makers. Now the public gets enough immediate information to form opinions and make decisions of its own. Also, since global commercial television shows no partiality, the enemy has access to the same analyses and intelligence information. And, at a speed which compels political and military authorities to respond quicker and at a frequency with which they formerly never had to cope. Realtime news compresses the decision-cycle. 
Notes

The Friction Of News Coverage
The combination of real-time visual imagery on television coupled with a public conditioned to film of bombs going down ventilator shafts has the public expecting perfection in war-which can never be perfect. This perception, and the media and telecommunications capabilities that helped create it, has the potential to affect 4 significantly the future use of US military force. To attain political objectives military leaders must understand and exploit the power of the media to promote public support for military operations.
The Cable News Network (CNN) now appears to be more pertinent than the CIA for current White House intelligence. The significance of CNN to the White House is that it represents the information which is in the hands of the public and which must be reckoned with by the political elites. CNN can, by default, set the political agenda. Public awareness will increase as multiple access to real-time news becomes more available. A censorship decision might not lead to the desired effect and could easily achieve the opposite outcome with the US public.
Television news has become an instrument of power in a new kind of warfare. The "CNN factor" has the potential to influence policy because of its ability to broadcast events live. 6 Reporters assess attack results in real-time, inform and misinform the public and bring viewers into the decision cycle of military leaders. This coverage can affect the conduct of battle because of the information it provides adversaries. News reports amplify the importance of events by the repetitious nature of broadcasts. The multitude of story angles frames the seriousness of events. In many cases, story angles sustain an event's commercial value, that is ratings. "Dramatic visual presentations can rapidly influence public-and therefore political-opinion so that the political underpinnings of war and operations other than war suddenly change with no prior indication," 7 suggests that commanders and planners should pay greater attention to media driven public opinion contingencies.
The essence of quality real-time reporting is in its timeliness, accuracy and perspective. The best way the press can responsibly cover military operations without endangering personnel or operational security is by negotiating press rules of engagement on real-time reporting with the military. Censoring US news coverage alone would not benefit the military. Censorship does not apply to international news crews so the stories would get out anyway. However, it is a bit disconcerting to military leaders in the field to know the coverage is being beamed all over the world. This concern led one general officer to state under terms of nonattribution, "People in the States know what's going on before you do in the task force CP." He told a story about an overseas reconnaissance mission where he was greeted by three hundred reporters. Camera crews cut down trees so they could get better film footage and reporters demanded interviews. It seems the press performs their own form of reconnaissance before the military has a chance to deploy.
Notes
Critics of the press view the military-media relationship as a zero-sum game. 
News Media's Impact During the Gulf War
Several case studies during the Gulf War serve to represent how real-time news biases decision-makers at the strategic and operational level. News also contributes to changes in political objectives, and therefore military strategy and objectives may be vulnerable to its influence. It also contributes to public sensitivity towards the military as an institution.
Gulf War Prelude
General Colin Powell realized, that if war came it would be on television instantly, bringing home the action, death, consequences and emotions even more graphically than during Vietnam. The reporters and the cameras would be there to record each step, vastly complicating all military tasks. Powell was sure of one thing, "A prolonged war on television could be impossible, unsupportable at home." On August 8, 1990 , General Powell addressed the media shortly after President Bush had addressed the nation about the mission for sending US troops to Kuwait. Powell made a direct appeal to reporters. "I also would ask for some restraint on your part as you find out information, if you would always measure it against the need for operational security to protect our troops. That should be uppermost, I think, in all our minds." 3 The following table lists the media incidents considered in this research. 
CINC Issues Press Guidance
Operational level concern over the media is important when preparing units and their commanders for battle. During times of war, news coverage is magnified because lives are at stake. General Schwartzkopf provided this terse, one-sided guidance to his subordinate commanders because he was convinced Saddam Hussein's best intelligence was coming from our newspapers and television reports:
You are going to be bombarded with questions from the press. I don't want you to discuss military operations. Period. I don't want you to discuss your capabilities. Period. And you should teach everyone of your officers the same thing. I don't care what Pfc. Snuffy says, but I do care when some officer gets so enamored with the press that he has to shoot off his mouth. I am telling you I am going to deal absolutely brutally, brutally, 
Live Coverage Of Artillery Duel Jeopardizes Offensive Plan
After the war Pete Williams claimed, "There was a television crew on the average with every Army and Marine division." 11 An example of how a television news crew covering a tactical event could have changed the campaign plan follows. General 
Press Coverage Concern Contributes To Disapproval Of Marine Amphibious Assault
Operational planning is also affected by concern over news coverage. Targeting decisions and schemes of maneuver were adjusted due to concern over how the media will depict an operation. During the planning of a possible Marine Corps amphibious assault of Kuwait, General Schwartzkopf worried, and so did the Marines, about the possibility of the Iraqis blowing up a liquid natural gas plant. The destruction of the plant would not sit well with the Kuwaitis and the media were sure to cover the attack. "That was the sort of political consideration the Marines did not have to worry about, but which Schwartzkopf had to deal with everyday." 13 Schwartzkopf had been careful to promote the image of the military and did not want to create a situation which could potentially generate negative press. After listening to the Marine Corps briefing, which Schwartzkopf agreed with, USMC Major General Harry
Jenkins, discussed the plan with Schwartzkopf. He felt if the American press knew about the purpose of the amphibious raid prior to the attack, they would accurately report the purpose of the operation. His comment was, "Our press beats their press to the punch," 14 referring to the pool reporters from the US versus the Iraqi press. The amphibious invasion was never approved, partially due to concern over press coverage.
Highway Of Death Coverage Expedites War Termination
About two weeks later, on 27 February 1991, and only three days into the ground This case depicts the psychological impacts the media brings into the strategic decision for conflict termination. 16 Clearly, political objectives must be satisfied prior to terminating military conflict. Air power applied to the battle of Khafji had similar results but the press had not been in Kuwait to cover the action.
17
Review Of Gulf War Cases
All these cases attest to news coverage affecting some decision-maker. There were many more stories which provide similar perspective. This sequence of events, broadcast daily over several months, was the last straw for
Congress and the public. Senator Robert Byrd's amendment to cut-off funding for the 5 Somalia operation was a result of this reporting. Politically, the cost-benefit ratio of continuing our involvement in Somalia was too great. The psychological effect on the American public, created by television, raised the risk to the Administration. President
Clinton ordered the troops home. Later, Anthony Lake, the US National Security Advisor stated, "American foreign policy is increasingly driven by where CNN points its cameras." 
Notes
General Schwartzkopf's Four Points For Dealing With The Press
Just prior to his first press briefing in theater, Schwartzkopf established four personal rules of engagement for himself when answering press questions. Because of his Vietnam experience he was concerned about projecting a positive military image to the public.
Additionally, he knew operational security was paramount in a campaign of this magnitude. His four rules became:
1. Don't let them intimidate you. 2. There is no law that says you have to answer all their questions. 3. Don't answer any question that in your judgment would help the enemy. 4. Don't ever lie to the American public. 1 Schwartzkopf reasoned press briefings were viewed by the Iraqi's because they were being transmitted via satellite to world-wide audiences. He wanted to send a message not only to the public but to Saddam Hussein and his military leaders as well.
General Powell's Cultivation Of Media Relations
Powell felt the success of the entire military depended on a mature understanding of public relations and politics, and how to use them. He took time to establish rapport with reporters so they would develop trust in him and accept his explanations of events. He felt in order for a general to be successful in Washington he had to be political. A great deal of Powell's time, and any general in Washington, is spent sensing the political environment and the media plays a big role in that arena. Powell put it this way, "It's the way in which we formulate our foreign policy. It's the way in which we get approval for our policy." 2
Establishing Press Rules Of Engagement During Military Operations
The few relevant incidents previously discussed underscore the need for tighter controls on the media when operating near the front lines. Unlike the combat cameramen of WW II who were given the freedom to go where they wanted and when they wanted, � Publication or broadcast of specific information DOD wanted kept secret, including numbers of troops, type of aircraft, weapons, equipment and supplies; � Future plans and operations; locations of forces; and tactics. � All combat reporting was done using pools or groups of reporters, whose work was subject to security review before it was released. � No reporters were allowed to rove freely in combat zones as they had in Vietnam. 5 Ground rules for the Gulf War were intended to prevent publication of details that could jeopardize an operation or endanger troops. 6 With these types of restrictions the public and the world witness an antiseptic version of the war. 
Using The Media For Psychological Operations
Many believe, "Commercial television is an important tool in informing as well as deceiving." Commanders could exploit the potential of televised media for its applicability in psychological operations (PSYOPS). In order for military PSYOPS broadcasts to be effective they must be believable, not obvious propaganda. Using commercial broadcasts would provide a heightened level of credibility with the enemy because its third party stature provides some assurance of truth, over military broadcasts.
Using commercial television for PSYOPS would have to be covertly subtle, done on a subliminal level, and would require special authorization.
Global news coverage is broadcast to friend and foe alike so its effects are impartial.
The public cannot use real-time news coverage for any tactical, operational or strategic advantage. This immediate information can only benefit the enemy. Using television broadcasts is nothing new for the PSYOPS community, but commercial global satellite coverage would put a slightly different spin on the current practice. Efforts are underway within the PSYOPS community to use emerging technologies as nonlethal weapons to enhance PSYOPS effectiveness; the challenge will be to develop it in the most cost effective way. Is it possible for US policy-makers to purposefully arrange news coverage to exploit its affect on international sensitivities or the will of the enemy? Was it purely coincidence the beach landing in Somalia was covered live, or did strategists coerce the media into covering it? The situation seems so bizarre that it may have been prearranged. Or, was this simply a poor decision by a military commander? It seems preferable to use psychological persuasion instead of the prolonged physical destruction which is routine in traditional warfare. However, the American Constitution guarantees press freedom and limits the authority of the Department of Defense to involve itself in the media.
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Reporters can also provide valuable intelligence and background information on people, terrain and facilities in a region. Many networks assign reporters to a geographic region to gain an intimate knowledge of the society and the culture. Military leaders should exploit this intelligence asset when entering a new theater. This is common practice for Special Operation Force teams when they perform missions in unfamiliar nations, or just as a way of maintaining rapport with contacts in their area of operations.
Recommendations For Future Operations
The impact of real-time news coverage is significant enough that military planners Recognizing international reporters are not bound by any US derived restrictions means military leaders must design comprehensive press rules of engagement. Allowing reporters to cover operations is vital to developing trust and confidence in the policy motives of using the military instrument of power. However, preventing reporters from taking satellite transmission equipment with them when covering tactical operations may be prudent in some situations. The press should agree that sanitized procedures for broadcast coverage, as depicted in Table 2 , serves US military interests while preserving the public's right to know. � Institute black-out periods to preserve surprise when initiating combat operations.
� Restrict satellite transmission equipment from the battlefield during on-going tactical engagements.
� Implement a moratorium on former DOD employees from providing military analyses during on-going operations.
� Ensure planners war-game media effects during course of action development.
Chapter 7
Future Implications of Real-time News Coverage
The people thinking hardest about warfare in the future know that some of the most important combat of tomorrow will take place on the media battlefield.
-Alvin Toffler War and Anti-war
Can strategic paralysis lead to mass psychological paralysis? Why not exploit the same technology which permits a lethal, precise form of air campaign for its potential in PSYOPS? This technology may create a means to inflict mass psychological paralysis through media induced persuasion. Television could become the weapon of choice in deception and psychological warfare in the future.
The designers of the air campaign focus on the physical destruction of the enemy's COG and minimize the psychological and social implications of applying military force.
The physical destruction of an enemy's war capability may be harder to achieve than the effort required to simply convince him, through psychological persuasion, to surrender.
Even with today's high technology advances, war remains a human enterprise with psychological factors affecting decisions individuals must make. British theorist, Captain Basil Liddel Hart, believed that, "In studying the physical aspect we must never lose sight Suppose we can preclude the violent physical destruction of enemy command and control facilities as practiced in the Gulf, by developing nonlethal technology with a softkill capability. Reducing the knowledge of a future opponent through nonlethal information warfare may achieve the same strategic advantage. Real-time news coverage can assist in this aim, if the enemy becomes reliant on civilian intelligence information.
The leadership confusion and public panic could affect the enemy's moral will to resist.
A plausible US strategy proposed by the Institute for National Strategic Studies uses new information technologies in a deterrent role. Assuming heightened sensitivity to casualties on either side, the US could locate a first set of targets, broadcast their location via information media, strike them, and then broadcast the destruction. 2 Real-time news reporting could be valuable covering these demonstrations assuming the enemy continues to trust the legitimacy of the news media. Strategists should consider this approach if deterrence or suppression of major regional conflicts is an objective. Given the competing demands for dwindling defense dollars and a down-sized military this seems prudent.
The author can not explore the technological aspects of these concepts recognizing this requires a separate technical effort worthy of other research. It suffices to suggest the implications of such innovative techniques for their value to PSYOPS and proposes that other researchers expand on this notion. 
Conclusion
Concern over how the media may portray military operations effects the planning of them. The media influenced important decisions such as when to end the Gulf War. The incidents reviewed attest to conditions for leaders at the strategic and operational level.
The research indicates political and military decision-makers are, "compelled to make more and more decisions about things they know less and less about at a faster and faster rate." The public is likely to become more sophisticated in its understanding of the mediaand more skeptical as well. First Amendment guarantees of press freedom cause "spin doctors" to be more subtle than those in countries in which governments control the media. 2 The author believes America's tradition of essentially open information is vital but that press freedom also creates a vulnerability for opponents to exploit. Real-time news could jeopardize operational security. Does the public's right to know include right to know immediately? The author presumes not, but space-based commercial communications assure the potential growth of real-time coverage.
Military leaders must either create innovative techniques to exploit the media to develop a military advantage or resign themselves to the power of the media and learn to mitigate its impact. Mitigating the impacts of instantaneous news is possible by instituting more restrictive rules of engagement covering the press. One of the primary strategic objectives of any contemporary military campaign includes destruction of enemy C 3 I nodes, and thereby, denying information to an opponent. It seems absurd to go to the effort of destroying an enemy's organic C 3 I capability and then allow news coverage to give him this type of information anyhow.
Eliminating news reporters' satellite transmission equipment from tactical locations has merit. Also, designing delays in coverage during on-going operations and restricting former DOD employees from serving as analysts for news programs during real-time operations serve to preserve the advantage over an adversary. Addressing media operations in OPORDs also permits planners and decision-makers to develop courses of action that are flexible to the potential impacts of news coverage.
Finally, putting a spin on J.F.C. Fuller's metaphor of a "shot through the brain," the news may sicken the enemy's stomach enough for the brain to reconsider its options. The technical limitations of television and other emerging technologies on the human senses may restrict the psychological power of media's current capability for military purposes.
However, "Before long, one may assume, the spin doctors and knowledge warriors of
